The Clash of Legal Cultures: The Treatment of Indigenous Law in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa by Ocran, Justice Modibo
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
July 2015
The Clash of Legal Cultures: The Treatment of
Indigenous Law in Colonial and Post-Colonial
Africa
Justice Modibo Ocran
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the International Law Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ocran, Justice Modibo (2006) "The Clash of Legal Cultures: The Treatment of Indigenous Law in Colonial and
Post-Colonial Africa," Akron Law Review: Vol. 39 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss2/4
OCRAN1.DOC 4/14/2006 1:13:40 PM 
 
465 
THE CLASH OF LEGAL CULTURES: THE TREATMENT OF 
INDIGENOUS LAW IN COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL 
AFRICA 
Justice Modibo Ocran* 
The historic Berlin Conference on Africa in 1885 is often credited 
with the official beginning of colonialism in Africa. However, this 
Conference, held among the principal colonial European powers 
(Germany, France, Britain, Belgium, and Portugal), essentially marked 
the agreement among those powers to define territorial areas of influence 
in Africa. Long before this Conference, individual European powers had 
reached their own accommodation with indigenous peoples of Africa in 
various corners of the continent. 
Thus, in the southern part of Ghana, then called the Gold Coast, the 
Bond of 1844 was signed by the British and the local chiefs in the 
southern part of the country under which the locals accepted British 
sovereignty or dominion over them in exchange for protection from their 
warlike neighbors further to the north. Indeed, Europeans interacted with 
the peoples of Africa for centuries before 1844.  In the Gold Coast, for 
example, as far back as 1475, the Portuguese had set foot at a coastal 
place they called Elmina (Portuguese for “the mine”). However, the 
Portuguese did not have much success with colonialism in West Africa. 
In the Gold Coast, they were kicked out successively by the Dutch and 
then the English, and the territory became a British colony. 
The story of the legal relationship between European and African 
legal systems that intrigues comparative lawyers starts in the 19th 
Century. As part of the Colonial Administration, the British naturally 
wanted to enforce law and order and to generally regulate the lives and 
habits of the people that they conquered. This was not always easy for 
the British, both as a practical matter and as a matter of legal doctrine 
and ideology. They encountered a legal system quite different from their 
 
*  Justice of the Supreme Court of Ghana; Jurist-In-Residence & Emeritus Professor of Law, 
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own legal traditions. They had to deal with a religion-based legal system 
simultaneously meant for secular application that was unlike other forms 
of religious law, such as Canon Law, which largely applied to the 
spiritual realm of life. They also faced hostile reaction from strong 
indigenous cultures which were not necessarily prepared to accept the 
assumptions of the Western cultural mind.  Ultimately, the culture 
accepted the creation of legal pluralistic systems in which the English 
dominated, but indigenous law also was maintained up to a certain 
point.1  
In other parts of Africa, it was not simply the clash between 
European and indigenous African cultural norms, but between European 
and Muslim or Islamic Law as well. A cultural influence of a different 
sort had already taken root. People had converted to Islam in some parts 
of Africa,2 and indeed in sections of the same community, while others 
in the same society had embraced Christianity.  This was the beginning 
of the “triple heritage” of the African legal system: traditional, Judeo-
Christian, and Islamic legal culture.3 
At the start of the legal history that we are concerned with, the 
characteristics of African society were either pre-industrial or traditional. 
Society was characterized by a subsistence level of living, using the 
sociological classificatory scheme of societies based on their level of 
socio-technical complexity.4 African economy at that point was heavily 
agrarian.5 Societies tended to be organized in small groupings, and “[t]he 
most important basis for [a] relationship was kinship.”6 Sociologists 
refer to them as “kin-dominated” societies.7 However, there were other 
factors that bound together individuals, such as their economics, politics 
and religion. Thus, these societies are also referred to as “multiplex” 
societies.8 Because of these socio-economic characteristics, there 
inevitably was a close identification of traditional society with 
customary law.  Individuals’ roles typically were allocated “on the basis 
of ascriptive criteria” or birthright-related characteristics, which 
 
 1. See ANTONY ALLOTT, NEW ESSAYS IN AFRICAN LAW (Allott ed., Butterworth & Co. Ltd. 
1970) (referring to adoption of some customary laws while implementing statutory regulation). 
 2. David S. Clark, The Idea of the Civil Law Tradition, in COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE  
INTERNATIONAL LAW 12-16 (David S. Clark ed., 1960). 
 3. Id. 
 4. JOHN H. BARTON  ET. AL., LAW IN RADICALLY DIFFERENT CULTURES 40 (West 
Publishing Co., 1983). 
 5. Id. at 41. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 42. 
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consequently depended on one’s “sex, kinship, nob[ility of] birth, age 
and . . . birth order.”9 The people were soaked in traditionalism and 
custom. Their mindset was: “[P]erform the ritual customs because your 
ancestors did so,” and “stick with something that seems to work.”10 
The starting point of custom is of course practice or long usage. In 
traditional African societies, custom became the principal, if not the 
only, source of law. Kings or chiefs occasionally issued edicts, but 
custom was decidedly the main source of law. The chief himself was 
bound by custom and indeed was the repository of custom. Thus, in 
Western discussions of sources of law, the focus on this epoch in Africa 
would not be on legislative or judicial formulations, but rather on 
custom; viewed as usage of a long duration. Usage led to custom, and 
part of custom eventually became customary law. Customary law comes 
partially from the customs of the people, that is, that portion of customs 
that the people have accepted as community-governing principles, the 
violation of which would result in punishment. The rest of custom, that 
is non-legal custom, would not normally lead to punishment when 
violated, but could still effectively regulate norms of conduct. Custom 
itself emerged not simply from what was practiced, but also from the 
highly influential morals and religious beliefs of the people. 
Traditional or customary law at that time was wholly unwritten for 
the simple reason that it was not a literate culture. Even today, much of 
customary law is unwritten, but there has been a growing corpus of 
treatises and court decisions setting down customary rules of law as the 
authors judge them to be.11 Therefore, it is now much easier to state the 
rule of customary law on a particular issue.12 
Indigenous or customary law in pre-colonial Africa is simply 
defined as rules of custom, morality, and religion that the indigenous 
people of a given locality view as enforceable either by the central 
political system or authority, in the case of very serious forms of 
misconduct, or by various social units such as the family. In terms of  
Western literature on the nature of law, jurists in these African societies 
were much closer to philosophies articulated by the German Karl von 
Savigny, and others in the historical school of jurisprudence. The core 
tenets of African customary law are its emphasis on collective 
responsibility, respect for the elderly, collective rights, and respect for 
 
        9.   Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. RENE DAVID & JOHN E. C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 
566 (3d. ed. 1985). 
 12. Id. 
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long-established institutions. 
However, this indigenous body of law began to face an assault from 
external influences in the form of Christian colonial power and Islamic 
religion. Would the new colonial powers reject African Law outright as 
somehow inconsistent with the primary imperative of colonialism to 
dominate the colonized people? If customary law was not to be accepted, 
could European law rule both European and non-European peoples in 
the enlarged colonial community? In any case, what should be the actual 
content of customary law in the new, multi-ethnic, African colonial 
states, where there are vastly different cultures and languages within one 
community?  This was a problem, because if custom partially defines 
customary law, and if custom itself is something that emanates from the 
people, then there would be as many customary laws as there were 
different communities. In the Gold Coast, for example, there were at 
least ten major ethnic groups.  In terms of custom and customary law, 
whose customary law should the British apply? Further, assuming the 
British knew what customary law consisted of, would they automatically 
apply it? Now that the British were the unchallenged colonial masters, 
intent on keeping their own proud tradition and culture, executing their 
so-called dual mandate in Africa, protecting the possessions of the 
Empire, and concurrently civilizing the peoples of Africa in the 
European ways, what were the British to do with the cultural norms of 
the conquered indigenous population? 
By way of comparison, a similar problem also arose in Latin 
America at the start of Spanish and Portuguese rule there. Woodrow 
Borah, writing on the accommodation of Spanish and Indian law in 
colonial Mexico, noted that during the mid-16th century, a series of 
discussions among Spanish policy-makers had “attempted to settle [the 
nature of] the relations[hip between the ruling Spanish group] and the 
subjugated communities.”13 This discussion took center stage 
particularly “from . . . 1511 on[wards when] some members of the 
[Spanish] bureaucracy, disturbed by the destruction of the Indian 
population in the Antilles and on the mainland, [sought to establish] less 
murderous systems of exploiting the colonies.”14 
 
 13. WOODROW BORAH, JUSTICE BY INSURANCE: THE GENERAL INDIAN COURT OF COLONIAL 
MEXICO AND THE LEGAL AIDS OF THE HALF-REAL 27 (University of California Press) (1983). 
 14. Id. 
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Borah notes that in general there were three schools of thought on 
this matter.15  
One [school] . . . held that the Indians, having developed their own 
[organized] society, were entitled to [keep] their own institutions and 
laws. Should they come under the rule of a foreign sovereign [such as] 
the Spanish King, he was bound to uphold and defend native 
institutions and laws . . . since he [in effect] served as the native prince. 
The most that might be conceded [in the name of] . . . change was the 
minimum necessary for extirpating idolatry and introducing 
Christianity.16  
The second school of thought focused on the idea of one society, 
which signified a determined assimilation of the Indians into Castilian 
institutions.17 This view was held by most crown jurists involved in 
“developing a unitary legal system which would replace feudal diversity 
with a uniform royal administration [based in Spain].”18 The third school 
“urged . . . the Indians and Spanish [to] be organized into two separate 
commonwealths, each with its own laws, customs and systems of 
government.”19 An extreme exposition of this view held “that the Indian 
commonwealth be so completely separate that it would be linked with 
the Spanish only by being subject to the same [metropolitan ruler].”20 
The difference between the first and the third schools appeared to be that 
in the first, the Spanish and Indians would be within the same political 
and legal community, whereas the third school envisaged a kind of 
federalism or separate states both working toward the potentate in Spain. 
As Borah notes, the official Spanish response was ambivalent but 
did suggest a rejection to a large extent of the “two republics idea” and 
the approximation of the first school of thought.21 This response was 
somewhat predictable. Indeed, this appeared to be one of the imperatives 
inherent in the imposition of alien sovereignty and religion, as well as 
the settlement of an alien upper class.  
[I]t was unthinkable that the Spanish [would] permit the continued 
practice of idolatry and human sacrifice, and the continued existence of 
the heathen religious hierarchies. It was equally unthinkable that the 
Castilian crown . . . officials [would leave intact] the old native 
 
 15. Id. at 28. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 28-29. 
 18. Id. at 29. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 31. 
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political superstructures and their administrative hierarchies.22  
Moreover, on the level of human relations, there eventually 
developed a considerable intermingling between Spanish and Indians. 
As “Spaniards took up residence in Indian towns . . . to establish 
businesses and care for properties, large numbers of Indians were drawn 
into Spanish households as permanent or semi-permanent workers.”23 
In colonial Africa, the merger of the two cultures occurred as the 
British accepted customary law to some extent, but also riddled it with 
so-called repugnancy clauses, in order to avoid those aspects of African 
customs that European culture found most appalling, ridiculous, or 
simply unhelpful to the inculcation of Christian ideals.24 The British 
colonial administrator and lawyer, R.S. Rattray, in his book entitled 
Ashanti Law and Constitution 25 provides several good examples of the 
kinds of crimes and civil offenses among the Ashantis of Ghana in the 
19th Century that the British would have found extremely strange, 
disgusting, amusing, or simply intolerable. Predictably, the colonial 
masters would battle with many of them. 
Several examples of criminal offenses can be provided.  The 
Ashantis, who inhabited the Gold Coast, referred to crimes as “Oman 
Akyiwade,” literally meaning “[t]hings hateful to the Tribe.”26 In 
Western jurisprudential language, they might be referred to as offenses 
against the state (even though we should remember that the state in the 
Western sense was not always present in 19th Century African 
communities).  
These [offenses] were looked upon as sins . . . which the central 
authority was bound to take immediate official notice, lest [the] 
supernational . . . [powers of the tribe] wreak their vengeance upon 
[the chiefs and subchiefs] whose paramount duty it was to protect the 
interest of the group.27  
Two things particularly baffled the British. One was the crime of 
suicide, and the other was witchcraft. 
The Ashanti crime of suicide refers to successful suicide and not 
attempted suicide, which is viewed as a crime in many non-African legal 
 
 22. Id. at 35. 
 23. Id. at 32. 
       24.   See infra notes 61-66. 
 25. R. S. RATTRAY, ASHANTI LAW AND CONSTITUTION (Vivian Ridler ed., Oxford University 
Press 1969) (1929). 
 26. Id. at 294. 
 27. Id. 
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systems as well.28 It was a crime to commit suicide, with only a few 
exceptions where suicide was excused.29 For example, it “was 
considered as honourable and . . . praiseworthy to kill oneself in war by 
taking poison or sitting on a keg of gunpowder to which a light was 
supplied, rather than to fall into the hands of the enemy; or to return 
home from war to a tell of defeat.”30 It was also excusable “to take one’s 
own life in order to accompany a beloved master to the world of the 
spirits.”31  Apart from these and other similar situations, suicide was 
considered to be a serious crime for which the society provided serious 
consequences.32 “[T]here was always a legal presumption that the 
motive for self destruction had been evil.”33 
But so what? In the “right to life” discourse, the bottom line is who 
has the right, if it exists at all?  In this traditional society the life and the 
body of individuals were supposed to belong to the community, and the 
central authority was the only party which had the right to take a life.  
Therefore, the central authority viewed with disfavor any attempt to 
interfere with “its prerogative as the sole dispenser of capital 
punishment.”34 It was also said that “the tribal authority may have placed 
suicide [among the capital offenses out of] a dislike [for] evil[-inclined] 
disembodied spirits wandering about in its midst.”35  
The spirit of the suicide became . . . a ghost wandering about in search 
of an abode; for it was debarred from entering the land of spirits until 
the expiration of its destined time upon earth, which it had itself 
wrongfully curtailed.36 
But since the person who committed the act of suicide was already 
dead, one might ask what difference it would make even if what he had 
done amounted to a crime. Surprisingly, the dead person would be 
brought back from his grave, if he had already been buried, “to stand . . . 
trial before the Council of Elders.”37 The “dead body was addressed by 
the Okyeame,” spokesperson of the Chief.38 “As soon as the Okyeame 
delivered his oration (basically condemning the dead man for 
 
 28. Id. at 299. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 299-300. 
 38. Id. at 300. 
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committing suicide), the Chief’s executioners would step forward and 
decapitate the dead body. Thus, suicide was a capital offense because it 
involved the losing of one’s head.39 “The kinsmen of the suicide 
[then] . . . had to produce every bit of his personal private property, 
which was then confiscated by the Chief.”40 
The second cause for consternation for the British was the crime of 
witchcraft or “Bayie.” “Witchcraft all over Africa was [something] 
regarded by the community with particular dread and abhorrence.”41 Of 
course, Western folklore is replete with stories of witches and ghosts, 
but to consider witchcraft as a criminal offense was a step apart. 
“Witchcraft was essentially the employment of anti-social magic.”42 The 
sorcerer, or the one who practiced witchcraft, would be put on trial, 
either “by having [him] tracked down by a witch finder, or as [a] result 
of an ordeal.”43 If found guilty, “the witch was either driven out with a 
fire-brand in his or her hand, to die of starvation, or was smeared all over 
with palm oil and cast into a fire, clubbed, strangled or drowned.”44 
Apart from the question of proof, another problem the British 
Colonial Jurists confronted in dealing with witchcraft was the legal 
options open to the victim or to his relatives. Was it appropriate, or 
legally excusable, to kill someone believed to be a witch?  More 
particularly, was it legally excusable to kill a witch in an anticipatory 
strike, in the manner of self defense? For example, if Mr. X had a 
spiritual experience or dream that someone planned to kill him by 
witchcraft, and preempts the attack by killing the person, should such 
homicide be excused as self defense? The suggestion that it was legally 
excusable to kill to preempt or prevent witchcraft baffled European 
jurists for years in Colonial African courts. 
There was yet another criminal act among the Ashantis, this time of 
a sexual nature, that seemed ridiculous to the European mind, but vividly 
demonstrated the thought-process of a mind steeped in animism. In the 
belief system of animism, the gods are supposed to lurk in the bushes, 
rivers, mountains, trees, and in the elements in general. Basically, it 
illustrates the impact of religious beliefs on law and on people’s attitudes 
toward punishment. Rattray described this offense as “sexual intercourse 
in the leaves,” and in the Twi language of the Ashantis was referred to as 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 301. 
 41. Id. at 313. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. Ordeal was favored as a mode of trial for witches. Id. 
 44. Id. at 313. 
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“ababantwe” or “ahahantwe.”45 A better English translation is having 
sexual intercourse in the bush. It was not that the Ashanti culture was 
unromantic, but no form of romance could come close to the defilement 
or desecration of the Goddess Earth, which the Ashantis called “Asaase 
Yaa.”46 Thus, an act which otherwise would not be a sin was regarded as 
such because of the impudence displayed in the face of the great 
supernatural powers. 
There were several gradations of this offense, including some 
regarded as criminal, and others regarded merely as disgusting forms of 
civil misbehavior.47 It was considered a capital offense to have sexual 
intercourse with a married woman in the bush through seduction or use 
of force.48 It was not so much the rape aspect or the woman’s marital 
status that attracted this type of punishment, but the fact that it was done 
in the special preserve of Asaase Yaa (in the bush).  At the very least, 
this required a high degree of propitiation, but in some cases the 
punishment was death. If the sexual act was committed with the 
woman’s connivance or consent, the male culprit, besides paying 
customary damages to the victim’s husband, and “was also fined a sheep 
which was sacrificed upon the spot where the adulterous act had taken 
place.”49 The following prayer in propitiation accompanied the ritual: 
Thursday’s Earth Goddess (i.e. Asaase Yaa), a man has a room, he has 
a mat, yet he seduced a woman here on the bare ground; because of 
that we have brought you this sheep. Moreover, if any one does so 
again, grant that the deed may be publicly known and “come out.”50 
This incantation, couched in language of ridicule, was in itself an 
effective sanction among the proud Ashanti. However, if the male culprit 
committed the sexual act in the bush without consent, then the Ashanti 
would inflict capital punishment, and “that almost invariably removed 
the necessity for any further formalities in the nature of propitiation.”51 
Outside the criminal law, there were other practices that baffled the 
Victorian morality of the British colonials.  The Masai ethnic group in 
Kenya practiced self help in which it was the prerogative of a murdered 
person’s family to go after the murderer, subject to the possibility of 
 
 45. Id. at 308. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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accepting so called “blood-money” as civil damages, in lieu of death.52 
Additionally, there was the general practice of widow inheritance. There 
was an “obligation [of the] widow to marry . . . a relative of the deceased 
husband.”53 There was also differential law of adultery by which the 
“husband could legally complain about his wife’s extra-marital affairs” 
and claim damages, but a wife could not do the same.54 
In some parts of Africa, there was “the absolute claim of the 
husband to legal paternity” despite the natural parenthood of the child.55 
Thus, in the famous Zimbabwe case of Vela v. Mandanika and Magutsa 
(1936 S.R. 171) plaintiff, M’s husband under customary law, 
successfully sued Defendant, the wife’s lover who had been living with 
her, for the custody of M’s children, fathered by Defendant.56 The 
Igberra tribe in Nigeria had the rule “that any child born within ten 
calender months of a divorce could become the property of the former 
husband,” in spite of the well-known rule that a child’s best interest is of 
primary importance.57 There was a practice of domestic slavery, along 
with other deprivation of personal freedom that had many of the 
attributes of slavery. 
In the area of succession or inheritance, the practice among the 
matrilineal communities of Africa, such as my own, was that one’s 
children had no right of inheritance. The property went to one’s maternal 
nephews and nieces.58 This might have been very strange to the English, 
who at one point practiced the rule of primogeniture. There was a clear 
lack of sympathy for individually-owned landed property in many parts 
of Africa, which led to the Ghanaian customary law that the individual’s 
acquired property would become “family property” (property of the clan 
or lineage) if the so-called owner utilized the help of other family 
members in construction of a house or the cultivation of a farm.59 
In the face of this clash of cultures and of legal thought, what were 
the British to do in Africa? As with the Spanish and the Portuguese in 
Latin America in the 16th Century, the matter had to be resolved one 
way or another.60 At least in some parts of Africa, the indigenous 
 
 52. ALLOTT, supra note 1, at 164. 
 53. Id. at 166. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. (noting that they are questionable under repugnancy laws). 
 56. Id. at 167. 
 57. Id. at 172. 
 58. Id. at 173 (citing Danmole v. Dawodu, [1958] 3 F.S.C. 46 (Nigeria)). 
 59. Id. (citing Larbi v. Cato, [1959] G.L.R. 35, H. Ct.). 
 60. STUART B. SCHWARTZ, SOVEREIGNTY AND SOCIETY IN COLONIAL BRAZIL, THE HIGH 
COURT OF BAHIA AND ITS JUDGES 1609-1751, at xiv-xv, 173-74, 185-86, 293-94, 304-05 (Lloyd 
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communities had very ancient and proud cultures. Their animist 
religious beliefs were strong and they were not about to give up their 
way of life and their core beliefs, despite the overwhelming military and 
political presence of the British. Were they to be physically 
exterminated? Were they to be allowed to maintain themselves as a 
people.  If so, what should happen to their body of laws and customs? 
The British eventually accepted customary law but put limitations on 
their content and application.61 The British had to retain their status as an 
imperial power as well as their public posture of introducing the 
indigenous people to the civilized ways of Britain. 
The legal strategy was to introduce “repugnancy clauses” into the 
definition of customary law. These clauses defined the portions of 
African customs that were to be viewed and applied as law within the 
colonial legal system.62 Not all customs would be tolerated as having the 
force of law under the British dispensation.63 Further, the content of 
customary law was subject to a time limitation.64  Customs did not have 
to exist from time immemorial, but such customs should at least have 
come into existence by the establishment of the colonial legislature in 
that particular territory (e.g. 1876 in the case of the Gold Coast).65 
Finally, any customary rule that was inconsistent with colonial 
legislation would be declared invalid.66 
The repugnancy clauses were meant to rule out laws and customs 
perceived to be against Christian values and morality or cruel and 
unusual by the standards of the colonizers.67 There were various 
formulations of these clauses. Some stated that the rules should not be 
“repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience.”68 Others 
read: “Not contrary to [religious] justice, morality or order.”69 Still 
others read: “Not repugnant to morality, humanity or natural justice or 
injurious to the welfare of the natives.”70 The repugnancy clauses were 
typically contained in a statutory definition of customary or native law.71 
 
Linford ed., University of California Press 1973). See also BORAH, supra note 13. 
 61. ALLOTT, supra note 1, at 158. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 150. 
 65. Id. at 151. 
 66. See id. at 175-77. 
 67. Id. at 162. 
 68. Id. at 158 (quoting Sierra Leone Local Courts Act 1965, § 76). 
 69. Id. (quoting Sudan Native Courts Ordinance 5.9(I)(a)). 
 70. Id. (quoting the African Courts Proclamation of Bechuanaland § I(2)). 
 71. Id. at 146 (noting that a typical formulation existed in the 1942 Native Court Proclamation 
of Botswana, at that time called Bechuanaland.  That proclamation read as follows:  
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Natural justice is supposed to encompass such propositions as 
follows:  
No man should be a judge in his own cause . . .; [n]o man is to be 
condemned unheard . . .; [a] man is entitled to know the particulars of 
the charge or claim against him . . .; [d]ecisions should be supported by 
reasons . . .; and [p]unishments and rewards should not be excessive, 
but should be proportionate to the circumstances of the offense.72  
As used in this legislation, the term “equity” did not refer to 
technical equity or to the body of rules formerly administered in the 
English Court of Chancery, but to equity in the sense of fairness.73 “This 
would permit a judge to waive technicalities of either English or African 
law and to disregard contemporary rules of law which would produce 
manifestly unfair results.”74 
“‘Morality’ or ‘good conscience’ is the least precise component of 
the repugnancy clauses.”75 It refers to morality in the general sense and 
thus lead to the inadmissibility of slavery, many forms of marriage 
without both parties’ consent, and many other invasions of freedom.76 
However, it was not morality in any particularly English sense because 
much of what the “English might have been tempted to call immoral was 
not always declared repugnant by the colonial system of justice.”77  It is 
also quite clear that the standards of morality in different communities 
are by no means the same. In fact, one British judge in a 1938 Tanzanian 
case  stated frankly:  
I have no doubt whatever that the only standard of justice and morality 
which a British court in Africa can apply is its own British standard. 
Otherwise we should find ourselves in certain circumstances having to 
condone such things, for example, as the institution of slavery.78 
The results of such determinations were not always predictable. For 
example, neither the form of marriage consideration, known in some 
 
“Native law or custom” and “Native custom” mean in relation to a particular tribe or in 
relation to any native community outside any tribal area the general law or custom of 
such tribe or community except so far as the same may be incompatible with the due 
exercise of His Majesty’s power and jurisdiction, or repugnant to morality, humanity or 
natural justice, or injurious to the welfare of the natives. 
 72. Id. at 159-60. 
 73. Id. at 160. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 162. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 163 (citing Gwao bin Kilimo v. Kisunda bin Ifuti (1938), 1 T.L.R. (R.) 403). 
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parts of Africa as Lobola, nor polygamy was declared as repugnant.79 In 
fact, in South Africa, the African Native Administration Act of 1937 
expressly provided that it would be unlawful for any court to declare the 
customs of Lobola and polygamy as repugnant.80 Yet in the case 
involving “exchange marriages” among the Tiv in Nigeria (that is, the 
practice whereby “the consideration for the bride is the receipt of a bride 
in exchange from [the groom’s] family”), such a practice was proscribed 
by an administrative fiat in 1927.81 
In Edet v. Essien, a child custody case from Nigeria, Plaintiff paid 
dowry for the woman while she was still a child and later that woman 
married another man, Defendant, who paid a second dowry to the 
parents.82 The children whose custody was at stake were issues between 
the woman and Defendant (the second man).83 The lower court held for 
Plaintiff and ordered the return of the children to him.84 However, an 
appellate court rejected Plaintiff’s case and said that even if the local 
customary law supported that result, it would not be applied as it was 
repugnant and opposed to natural justice.85 
Soon after Africa attained political independence, from the late 
1950s onward, the African intellectual elite decided to modify the 
colonial repugnancy clauses. They felt insulted by the notion that their 
own African laws were somehow repugnant. “Repugnant to what or to 
whom?,” they asked. They wished to emphasize the fact that these laws 
represented their own ethos. Similarly the term “native law” fell into 
disfavor because of its colonial connotation as uncivilized. Thus, a new 
type of legislation emerged in countries like Ghana, Sierra Leone, and 
Botswana. Incompatibility with legislative enactments or of decisions of 
the highest court of the land became the main criteria for distinguishing 
between unacceptable and permissible customary rules within the legal 
system. Thus, as early as 1958, one year after Ghana attained 
independence from Britain, the Local Courts Act of Ghana defined 
customary law as “any uncodified rules having the force of law and not 
repugnant to the laws of Ghana . . . [including] any declaration of 
customary law published from time to time in the Gazette.”86 
In 1960, the Interpretation Act of Ghana, completely eliminated the 
 
 79. Id. at 165. 
 80. Id. n.12 (citing The South African Native Administration Act 1927 § II (I)). 
 81. Id. at 165-66 n.13. 
 82. Id. at 171. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Local Courts Act of Ghana (Act No. 23 of 1958). 
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word “repugnant.”87 After defining customary law as rules of law 
applicable to particular communities in Ghana, the Act went on to state 
that, “[a] reference in an enactment to a customary law shall be 
construed as a reference to it as affected by any enactment for the time 
being in force.”88 Tanzania’s Interpretation and General Clauses 
Ordinance, as amended in 1963, was even more forthright. There was no 
reference to repugnancy, natural justice, equity, or good conscience. It 
simply stated that customary law “does not include any rule or practice 
which is abolished, prohibited, punishable, declared unlawful or 
expressly or impliedly disapplied [sic] or superseded by written 
law. . . .”89 
It should be noted that under the Ghana Interpretation Act, 
customary law gained enough status that a portion of it could now be 
assimilated into the newly defined common law of Ghana as suitable for 
general application throughout the country.90 Within this new definition, 
assimilated rules of customary law took precedence over the English 
rules of equity and the English common law.91 On the other hand, 
unassimilated customary law remained the customary law proper.92 Such 
customary law took precedence over the redefined common law if the 
parties to a suit or transaction came from the same tribal group and had 
the same personal law.93 It was only when the parties did not have the 
same personal law, and neither could show why the issue at stake should 
be governed by his or her personal law, that the common law became the 
applicable law.94 
Yet one could deduce from the language of these post-colonial 
statutes and constitutions that customary law is still subordinate to other 
sources of law in the African legal systems. A hierarchy of norms had 
been created, and customary law was not on top of the list. Rules of 
customary law would be struck down if they conflicted with a superior 
court decision. Article 11(1) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana clearly 
defines this hierarchy.95 It enumerates the sources of law in Ghana, in 
 
 87. The Interpretation Act 1960, (C.A.4) § I8(1). 
 88. ALLOTT, supra note 1, at 176 n.11. 
 89. Id. at 180 (citing the Interpretation and General Clause Ordinance (cap I, as inserted by 
the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1963, Sixth Sched.) § 2 (I)). 
 90. The Interpretation Act 1960, (C.A.4) § I8(I)(I).  See also, 1992 GHANA CONST. Ch. 4., art. 
11. 
 91. BENTSI-ENCHILL, GHANA LAND LAW 85-86 (Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd.) (1964). 
 92. Id. at 86. 
 93. Id. (referencing Rule 2). 
 94. Id. (referencing Rule 3). 
 95. 1992 GHANA CONST., Ch. 4, art. 11. 
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part, as follows: 
(1) The laws of Ghana shall comprise- 
(a) this Constitution; 
(b) enactments made by or under the authority of the Parliament 
established by this Constitution; 
(c) any Orders, Rules and Regulations made by any person or authority 
under a power conferred bythis Constitution. 
(d) the existing law; and 
(e) the common law. 
(2) The common law of Ghana shall comprise the rules of law 
generally known as the common law, the rules generally known as the 
doctrines of equity and the rules of customary law including those 
determined by the Superior Court of Judicature. 
(3) For the purposes of this article, “customary law” means the rules of 
law, which by custom are applicable to particular communities in 
Ghana. 96 
The 1992 Constitution (the current Ghanaian Constitution), has 
thereby retained the 1960 approach of permitting part of customary law 
to become part of the common law.97 
There is, however, an unfortunate drafting problem in Article 11 
(3), which defines customary law, “for the purpose of this article” (i.e. 
for the whole of Article 11), as rules of law which, by custom, are 
applicable to particular communities in Ghana.”98 If part of customary 
law can become part of the common law, which are rules of general 
application in Ghana, then the entire body of customary law should not 
simultaneously be defined as rules applicable to particular communities 
in Ghana. The distinction elegantly drawn in the 1960 Act between 
assimilated customary law of general application and the remaining 
corpus of customary law applicable only to particular communities, was 
not fully captured in the present constitutional definition. 
The Judiciary in Africa still has some juridical problems in 
 
 96. Id. (eliminating sections 4-7). 
 97. See ALLOTT, supra note 1. 
 98. 1992 GHANA CONST., Ch. 4, art. 11 (3). 
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applying customary law as a source of law. First, at least a portion of 
customary law is still the law of particular ethnic or tribal groups or 
communities in Africa and not necessarily the general law. Second, 
certain aspects of those rules are outmoded and inconsistent with modern 
ideas of morality, even as viewed by Africans. Third, some customary 
norms may be inimical to development. Thus, rather than being 
ultranationalist in our attitude as jurists, the task is to modify customary 
law in aid of modernization. The judiciary and legislature need to adapt 
African indigenous law to make it a tool of socio-economic development 
without sacrificing the core values of African society: the values of 
fellowship, of being each other’s keeper, and the notion that the free 
development of each is indeed a condition for the free development of 
all. 
The modern African judge will be the first to acknowledge that, in 
many senses, the problems faced by the British judges in colonial Africa 
have not vanished.99 Almost one hundred percent of the African 
judiciary is now African.100 But even though there is no longer the gross 
disparity of national origin between a judge and his community, a judge 
often does not come from the particular locality whose ethnic law he is 
administering.101 Apart from this ethnic question, there is an enormous 
educational and cultural gap between a senior judge with a Western 
education and the ordinary families he may deal with. Thus, the judicial 
system may have moved from a problem of race and ethnicity to one of 
class. 
The promise of legal pluralism is still dear to us, but the 
fundamental difficulties in its administration are real. Jerome Frank, one 
of the theorists of American Legal Realist school, in his 1949 book 
entitled Courts on Trial, discusses what he calls “the myth about the 
non-human-ness of judges.”102 In a chapter entitled “Are Judges 
Human,” Frank notes that “legal rules express social policies . . . and a 
judge’s conception of such policies respond more or less to his social, 
economic and political outlook, which usually derives from his 
education, his social affiliation and his social environment.”103 
In our own time, the Critical Legal Studies scholars have restated 
this point of view in more radical terms, much to the annoyance of other 
 
 99. ALLOTT, supra note 1, at 255. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 147 
(Jerome Frank ed., Princeton University Press 1973) (1949). 
 103. Id. at 148. 
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contemporary legal theorists. But the gravamen of their complaint, and 
their determination to blow away the myth of the universally objective 
judge, is very real. It is real even with African Judges when they are 
called upon to apply or reject certain norms of African customary law. 
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